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Abstract—Primary User Emulation (PUE) attack and 
Spectrum Sensing Data Falsiﬁcation (SSDF) attack on Data 
Fusion Centre and attack on Common Control Channel (CCC) 
is a serious security problems and need to be addressed in 
cognitive radio network environment. We are reviewing the 
recent advances of threats for the future 5th Generation (5G) 
wireless radio network from these attacks. Several existing 
security schemes have been proposed and discussed to overcome 
these attacks. We propose new security scheme that able to 
mitigate the attacks and provide security solutions. This scheme 
intended to mitigate the threats from the attacks in CRN and 
improve the future 5G network security. 
 
Index Terms—CRN; Data Fusion; Radio Network; Wireless 




Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) was introduced as a 
promising technology to solve the issues of spectrum scarcity 
in cellular wireless network due to the increasing number 
demand of wireless services [1]. Cognitive Radio Network is 
part of the 5G initiative towards high speed and secure 
wireless radio network.  
The concept of the 5G network is promising to satisfy the 
growing needs of mobile wireless communication. Along 
with increasing data rate, number of users, reliability and 
coverage of the mobile network, security is a matter of key 
importance that requires careful consideration. As with the 
upcoming spread of the Internet of Things (IoT) that the 5G 
network is going to propagate to almost all aspects of our 
lives, security will become even more crucial than it is now 
[2].  
Security is one of the fundamental aspects of the next 
generation mobile network [3]. Many new technologies are 
emerging to be deployed in the 5G network and improve its 
performance. Their security issues should be examined so 
that appropriate countermeasures can be taken before new 
technologies are deployed into live operation. Novel 
approaches for security enhancement also have been 
proposed. In particular, physical layer security seems to offer 
reasonable solutions for many security requirements [4]. It is 
important to recognize its possible risks and point out topics 
for further research.  
The rapidly growing number of mobile devices, capacious 
data and higher data rate are pushing to reconsideration the 
existing generation of the cellular mobile communication. 
The next or ﬁfth generation (5G) wireless network is expected 
to meet high end requirements. The 5G networks would 
provide novel architecture and technologies beyond state of 
the art architecture and technologies. The new research track 
will lead the elementary changes in the design of ﬁfth 
generation (5G). The 5th generation mobile network signiﬁes 
the next foremost phases of mobile telecommunications 
standards beyond the current 4G. 5G has speeds beyond what 
the current 4G can offer.  
The Next Generation Mobile Networks Alliance realizes 
that 5G should be rolled out by 2020 to meet the business and 
consumer demands. In addition to providing simple faster 
speeds, they expect that 5G networks also will need to meet 
the needs of new use case, such as Internet of Things (IoT) as 
well as broadcast-like services and lifeline communication in 
times of natural misfortune. Cognitive Radio Network will 
help 5G by Device-to-device (D2D) communication [5], 
Moving Network (MN) [6], Ultra Dense Network(UDN) [7] 
and Self Organizing Network(SON) [8].  
Cognitive Radio Network consist of two type of users that 
are licensed primary user (PU) of the cellular network and 
unlicensed secondary user (SU). Secondary user constantly 
observed the licensed spectrum band by performing spectrum 
sensing to check the availability of the channel for them to 
use. When vacant spectrum channel discovered, secondary 
user will transmit using the available channel. However, in a 
legitimate manner, if secondary user sense any PU signal 
which indicates that PU wants to use the channel, SU will 
need to back off and ﬁnd another available channels [9]. 
There are several well-known challenges CRN. Among them 
are:  
• Performance degradation overall Cognitive Radio 
Net-work Quality of Service (QoS) and underutilized 
channel usage in Cognitive Radio Network due to 
attack from malicious user.  
• Protecting the Data Fusion Centre becomes target for 
false data input and data manipulation. Data fusion 
centre used to store information from legitimate user 
details and makes global decision  
• Denial of Service attack on Data Fusion and Common 
Control Channel.  
In this paper we will address the security issues in 5G wire-
less network. In particular, we study the security challenges 
of CRN in 5G. This paper aims to review the advances of 
threats in primary user emulation attack, spectrum sensing 
Journal of Telecommunication, Electronic and Computer Engineering 
180 e-ISSN: 2289-8131   Vol. 9 No. 2-10  
data falsiﬁcation (SSDF) attack in CRN and attack against 
Common Control Channel which become the path for data 
dissemination. 
The objectives of this review is to identify critical security 
threats on Cognitive Radio Network, Data Fusion Centre and 
Common Control Channel in 5G wireless network 
environment. We will propose new security scheme to secure 
Cognitive Radio Network, Data Fusion and Common Control 
Channel against Primary User Emulation Attack, data 
falsiﬁcation and attack such as Denial-of-service to Data 
Fusion Centre and Common Control Channel. The proposed 
security scheme will be evaluated using simulation against all 
the identiﬁed attacks in Cognitive Radio Network in 5G 
cellular network environment.  
Based on the critical analysis of the literature review, we 
suggest future direction of the Cognitive Radio Network 
technology in the 5G wireless network environment with 





An attack in cognitive radio network environment can 
happen due to Secondary User (SU) ability to sense signal 
and making decision, attacker can imitate Primary user signal 
that can caused Secondary User to back off. Attackers can 
emulate Primary User signal to enforce Secondary User to 
vacate the speciﬁc band. This is called as Primary User 
Emulation(PUE) attack. We categorize the attacks of Primary 
User Emulation into three characteristics: 
• Greedy/Selﬁsh - Secondary User (attacker) emulates 
Primary User signal so it can use the vacant channel 
for itself [10].  
• Malicious - Secondary User (attacker) emulated 
Primary User signal to caused Denial of Service attack 
[11], [12] 
• Mixed - Between selﬁsh and malicious [13]. 
In Yu, R et al. [14] outlined in their work that security is 
very important by not well addressed issue in Cognitive 
Radio network and Primary User Emulation attack is a 
serious security problem in cognitive radio network. 
According to Sharma et al. [15], Cognitive Radio systems are 
vulnerable to numerous security threats that affect the overall 
performance. Dynamic sharing of the spectrum between 
multiple users poses several signiﬁcant challenges in security 
and trust [16]. Intrinsic characteristic of Cognitive Radio 
opens new ways for attackers [17]. Dynamic behaviour of 
Cognitive Radio Network, conventional attack detection 
scheme unable to detect attack on Common Control Channel 
[18]. Primary User Emulation is the most studied attack in 
Cognitive Radio Network [19].  
For cooperative sensing, which Cognitive Radio use to 
deliver the spectrum sensing report to the Data Fusion Centre 
using Common Control Channel (CCC). Other than 
centralized Data Fusion Centre, it also able to update and 
share with neighboring nodes the spectrum sensing report if 
there are any changes to the results. For spectrum sensing 
report, it must meet three control channel requirements which 
is the bandwidth, reliability and security [1]. Due to Primary 
Emulation attack, the available channel is use dedicatedly by 
greedy secondary user and possibly not being used at all. This 
is causing overall performance degradation in Cognitive 
Radio Network Quality of Service (QoS) and underutilized 
channel usage.  
The main reason of using CRN is to fully utilizing the 
available vacant channel but due to attack such as Primary 
User Emulation, it fails to achieve the goal. Data fusion centre 
is used to store information of legitimate user details to 
overcome the malicious PUE attack. However, by protecting 
the Data Fusion itself also causing it to be targeted for false 
data input also known as SSDF attack. Apart from that, there 
are possibility of denial of service attack on Data Fusion 
Centre and Common Control Channel (CCC). User unable to 
check status of Primary User and Secondary User 
trustworthiness and makes it vulnerable to attack and making 
wrong decision. 
As we discuss further about the Data Fusion Center as they 
are subjected to Spectrum Sensing Data Falsiﬁcation (SSDF) 
Attack. Collaborative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) has been pro-
posed to overcome the problem effect of multipath fading, 
shadowing, and hidden station issues [1].  
Unfortunately, the CSS is vulnerable to Spectrum Sensing 
Data Falsiﬁcation (SSDF) attacks as well [20]. In an SSDF 
attack, the malicious Cognitive Radio user intentionally sends 
a falsiﬁed local sensing result to the Data Fusion Center 
(DFC) in an attempt to cause it to make incorrect global 
decision. To mitigate the problem of SSDF attack, many 
approaches have been proposed as we reviewed later.  
In [21], Lu et. al has proposed scheme using hard decision 
scheme. The spectrum sensing process divided into two. First 
is the identifying stage and second is the sensing stage. At the 
identifying stage, they propose a scheme to identify reliable 
secondary users in the CRN. At the sensing stage, fusion 
center receives decision reports from all user identiﬁed in the 
identifying stage and trusted nodes to make global decision. 
In this scheme, it only accepts report from known and trusted 
user.  
Independent and collaborative SSDF attacks have been 
developed in [12]. Naqvi et. al. proposed a novel reputation 
based scheme to identify the attackers. They illustrate that in 
the presence of 50% independent attackers, their proposed 
approach cannot differentiate between the malicious and 
benign users. However, for collaborative attack, this ratio 
reduces to 35%.  
In [22] a hybrid method called Weighted Sequential 
Probability Ratio Test (WSPRT) was proposed. The method 
combines the nodes reputation and uses Sequential  
Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to identify malicious users. 
Compared with SPRT, the WSPRT improves correct sensing 
probability at the cost of increasing sampling overhead. A 
new scheme to countermeasure against SSDF attack in CSS, 
called Conjugate Prior-based (CoP) was proposed in [23]. 
The probability function of random sensing reports and each 
sensing report is examined for the normality based on a 
conﬁdence interval. 
As a countermeasure against SSDF attacks, [24] propose a 
new method called Attack-Aware CSS (ACSS). The idea 
based on attack strength estimation, where the attack strength 
is deﬁned as the probability that a given user is malicious. The 
proposed ACSS method obtains the attack strength and 
applies it in koutN rule to deriving the optimal value of 
parameter k to minimize the Bayes risk. Simulation results 
presented the effectiveness of the proposed method. A 
common way of evaluating a decision rule is by computing 
the result called Bayes risk.  
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Figure 1: Overview of Cognitive Radio 
 
Bhattacharjee et al. [25] has proposed an apriori algorithms 
scheme. The ability of this scheme is same in as method in 
detecting the spectrum sensing data falsiﬁcation. The apriori 
scheme by attacker need to send an association in the sensing 
report then sent to the data fusion centre (DFC), ﬁnally the 
apriori take part by capture identify the association and trying 
to detect the SSDF attack. The SSDF attack is one of the 
attack that affected data fusion centre (DFC) in way give a 
false sensing report including modify the sensing report. 
There is weakness in this scheme where this scheme only able 
to detect the SSDF attack but unable to protect the cognitive 
radio network itself. However, the simulation still success 
and the apriori algorithms can been used as a scheme to 




Figure 2: Primary User Emulation Attack 
 
The ARC algorithms scheme are current work of 
independent and collaborative spectrum sensing data 
falsiﬁcation attacks which is proposed by Priya and 
Nandhakumar [26]. They found that ARC schemes 
successfully reduced the error rate and capable of identifying 
the attacking node including overcoming the false detection 
rate of another original channel. 
To understand better about Cognitive Network 
environment, Figure 2 shows the Primary User Emulation 
attack prevent SU to sense the spectrum correctly and 
accurately. SU must have priori known characteristic of the 
PU signal. With that knowledge, it can sense PU signal and 
vacant the channel it occupied. One of the proposed method 
to solve inaccurate sensing by using Data Fusion Centre 
(DFC) to collect all the SU sensing report and DFC will 
generate decision based on the SU contribution. However, 
using DFC introduce another problem of how reliable the 
collected data, what if malicious user contribute more false 
data is more than good secondary user which will lead to 
wrong decision and integrity of the DFC itself. This is called 
the Spectrum Sensing Data Falsiﬁcation attack as illustrated 
in Figure 2. The new secondary user that rely fully on Data 
Fusion Centre will accept the DFC decision instead of sensing 
for vacant channel at the Primary Base station. In DFC, ﬁnal 
decision is made based on several parameters such as OR, 
AND, k out of N and Majority. We assume there are three 
types of malicious SU in SSDF attack: 
• Smart Malicious SU When it senses 0 (vacant) from 
the primary base station, it will send 1 (occupied) as 
the report to Data Fusion Centre (DFC) and visa-versa. 
• Always Occupies Malicious SU It will always send 1 
to the Data Fusion Centre, although it is not a smart as 
the ﬁrst malicious SU, it caused DOS attack as it 
implies that the channel always not available. 
• Always Vacant Malicious SU It will always send 0 to 
the Data Fusion Centre. SU will attempt to use the 
channel assuming it is vacant but unfortunately it is 
unavailable. It will consume energy and time. 
Basically, SSDF attack need collaborative attack to make it 
a successful attack. We assume to have N secondary users, 
each of SUs sense the channel at the beginning of each slot 
and report their decisions to DFC by one bit, H1(=1) and 
H0(=0) denote the presence and absence of a primary signal 






where Si(t) is a primary signal, Hi(t) is a channel coefﬁcient 
that is multiplied by signal and ni(t) is Additive White 
Gaussian Noise (AWGN). The threshold that is denoted by in 







where Pf is the detection probability of false alarm in wireless 
environment, u is time-bandwidth product and n2 is a variance 
of noise. 
 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this section, we will discuss the challenges that need to 
be addressed for the threats by the attacks and proposed the 
possible solutions. The ﬁrst challenge is determining the 
spectrum sensing algorithm accuracy to archive the accurate 
spectrum value. The second challenge is how to use the 
collaborative spectrum sensing algorithm to make ﬁnal 
decision with integrity and trusted value. The third challenge 
is how to secure the channel to deliver the individual result 
which is secure and tamper-proof. We propose for sensing the 
channel availability from the stationary nodes. Stationary 
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which is not mobile and ﬁxed location. This type of nodes is 
more predictable, traceable and able to build up good 
reputation over time. As for mobile nodes, they come and go 
all the time and it can be anywhere and their identity can be 
falsiﬁed easily. Their location also not ﬁxed and easy to 
masquerade any other mobile nodes. Referring to Figure 3, 
the spectrum sensing from stationary nodes is accepted by the 
Data Fusion Centre. The Data Fusion Centre must have 
preliminary data of the identity of each contributing 
stationary nodes including its location. As for mobile nodes, 
their spectrum sensing report contribution are dropped or 
rejected when received by the Data Fusion Centre. In this 
scheme, the reliability of the report contributed by the 





Figure 3: Stationary Nodes Sensing Available Spectrum and Reporting to 
Data Fusion Centre in Cognitive Radio Network 
 
For Common Control Channel, there are several methods 
ensure integrity of the data that use CCC as the channel to 
send data to Data Fusion Centre and share data to neighboring 
nodes. As we assume we apply the same method of stationary 
nodes, we can use technique of shared key encryption which 
encrypt each data that used the Common Control Channel 
before being sent by the stationary nodes and decrypt in once 
received by the Data Fusion Centre. Using simple encryption 
technique, keys can easily be generated and distributed 
among the stationary nodes. Data Fusion Centre also can 
challenge from time to time to ensure the data received come 
from the authentic source of stationary nodes.  
For Data Fusion Centre, the incoming data are controlled 
by the encryption keys. If they unable to decrypt the data, it 
means it does come from the usual stationary nodes and will 
be dropped. Only encrypted data with identity of trusted 
stationary nodes will be decrypted and counted towards 
making global decision.  
Other mobile nodes rely on the Data Fusion Centre. With 
this proposed scheme, it able to secure the report, channel and 
ensure integrity of the data. Mobile nodes will need less 
computational power thus increasing the network 
performance. Less computational also able to save on energy 
and organize the network efﬁciently. 
  
IV. CONCLUSION  
 
As conclusion, we have reviewed the recent threats and 
countermeasures for attack against Cognitive Radio Network 
system. Cognitive Radio Network roles will able to help 5G 
wireless network to meet the user demand for high speed and 
secure wireless environment. The proposed security schemes 
that able to improve the security performance and network 
performance in term of high speed in Cognitive Radio 
Network and. In the future, we will proof this scheme using 
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